Interim Measures in Inter-State Proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights: Ukraine v. Russia by Kirchner, Stefan
University of Baltimore Journal of International Law
Volume 3
Issue 1




Interim Measures in Inter-State Proceedings before




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ubjil
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons, and the
International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kirchner, Stefan (2014) "Interim Measures in Inter-State Proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights: Ukraine v.




INTERIM MEASURES IN INTER-STATE 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: UKRAINE V. RUSSIA 
Dr. Stefan Kirchner 
“Does no one remember the former Yugoslavia? Using principles 
of self-determination to justify ethnic homogeneity has resulted in 
ethnic cleansing. This brand of nationalism carried to its logical 
conclusion is ugly, plain and simple.”1 
 
ABSTRACT: Over the course of the year 2014, the situation in 
Ukraine has turned from a domestic political issue involving protests, 
killings, and the ouster of the former president, into a military 
confrontation with Russia.  At the time of writing (August 2014), 
Russia has annexed Crimea and is supporting separatists, who are in a 
state of civil war against the Ukrainian state, in Eastern parts of the 
country.  This conflict is ongoing and an unknown number of civilians 
have been killed, notably the passengers of the Malaysia Airlines flight 
MH17, which is thought to have been shot down over the conflict zone. 
Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians have become refugees, the 
majority being internally displaced persons, many also fleeing into 
Russia. Both Ukraine and Russia are parties to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  In addition to the individual 
complaints procedure, the European Convention on Human Rights 
allows for inter-state complaints. Ukraine has already used this 
procedural possibility, in the Crimea takeover in March 2014, to bring 
Russia before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  While 
rarely utilized, this procedure has been employed by states to protect 
specific rights of citizens, or deal with a conflict with other states.  In 
particular, in the absence of jurisdiction by, for example, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the ECtHR is a forum which can 
be reached immediately so long as parties to the ECHR are involved. 
 
 1. Lea Brilmayer, Why the Crimean Referendum is Illegal, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/14/crimean-referendum-
illegal-international-law. 
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This article analyzes the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights in inter-state complaints pertaining to armed conflicts and 
situations of occupation.  It will be shown that, although the conflict is 
still ongoing and the situation could be considered political in nature, 
there are indeed legal grievances for which the ECtHR is the right 
forum.  In addition, the applicability of the ECHR to situations of 
armed conflict will be investigated.  While the case between Ukraine 
and Russia is still pending before the ECtHR, the Court has already 
issued interim measures.  While the European Court of Human Rights 
usually enjoys a very high rate of compliance, the question is if the 
current obvious non-compliance by both parties threatens to 
undermine the persuasive power of the ECtHR. 
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INTERIM MEASURES IN INTER-STATE 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS: UKRAINE V. RUSSIA 
Dr. Stefan Kirchner 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In March 2014, Russia annexed the Ukrainian territories of 
Crimea and Sevastopol after (initially unidentified) gunmen had taken 
over the area2 and after a referendum (the democratic nature3 and 
legality of which, under international law,4 have been contested) had 
allegedly shown a majority vote for independence from Ukraine.  
Russian forces took over Crimea in response to what Vladimir Putin 
referred to as “uncontrolled crime spreading to the eastern region of 
the country,”5 which culminated in the annexation on March 18, 2014,6 
and which is seen by Russia as a “reunification.”7 
 
 2. Ukraine Crisis: Timeline, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
26248275 (last updated Nov. 13, 2014). 
 3. Brilmayer, supra note 1. 
 4. Crimea Result Makes “a Mockery” of Democracy, Says Hague, BBC NEWS, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-26606556 (last updated Mar. 16, 2014). 
 5. Chrisella Herzog, Political Legitimacy and International Law in Crimea: Pushing the 
U.S. and Russia Apart, DIPLOMATIC COURIER (May 8, 2014), 
http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/topics/politics/2187-political-legitimacy-and-
international-law-in-crimea-pushing-the-u-s-and-russia-apart.  
 6. Shaun Walker & Ian Trayner, Putin Confirms Crimea Annexation as Ukraine Soldier 
Becomes First Casualty, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 19, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/putin-confirms-annexation-crimea-
ukrainian-soldier-casualty. 
 7. Herzog, supra note 5. 
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Crimea, which is also home to a small minority of predominantly 
Jewish Karaims,8 was known as Taurica in antiquity9 and has been 
ruled by Greeks, Romans, Goths, Mongols and Byzantium.10  
Geographically, the term “Crimea” refers to the peninsula as a whole.  
From a political Ukrainian perspective, it consists of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea (which already enjoys more autonomy than 
Ukraine’s regions or oblasts) and the city of Sevastopol, which, like 
the capitol Kyiv, enjoys special status in Ukrainian law.  Both the 
autonomous province of Crimea and the special status city of 
Sevastopol were included in the self-proclaimed “Republic of 
Crimea,” which then sought admission to the Russian Federation. 
From a Russian point of view, the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea is now one of the Federal Subjects of the Russian Federation.  
Russia consists not of states but of Federal Subjects that may have 
different designations, such as republics, provinces, districts or 
territories.  The latter is similar to the organized incorporated territories 
in the United States, although all Russian Federal Subjects are legally 
equal under Russian Constitutional Law.  Sevastopol is considered by 
the Russian government to be one of three Federal Cities of Russia, 
like Moscow and St. Petersburg.  All Federal Cities are also Federal 
Subjects under Russian law, unlike Washington D.C. in the United 
States, but similar to the status of the city-states of Berlin, Hamburg, 
and Bremen in Germany.  By designating the Crimea and Sevastopol 
in accordance with terminology already used to describe Russia’s 
administrative subdivisions, the Russian government has made it clear 
that it not only intends to occupy, but to annex these areas into Russia.  
These steps can be seen as an attempt to take back at least some of the 
territory lost when the Soviet Union (USSR), which was heavily 
dominated by Russia, fell apart, which has also raised concern over 
Russia’s ambitions among other European states. 
 
 8. Paul Goble, The Karaims - Another Forgotten People of Crimea Now at Risk, 
INTERPRETER MAG. (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.interpretermag.com/the-karaims-
another-forgotten-people-of-crimea-now-at-risk/. 
 9. Adam Taylor, To Understand Crimea, Take a Look Back at its Complicated History, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/to-understand-
crimea-take-a-look-back-at-its-complicated-history/.  
 10. Id. 
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An allegedly independent “Republic of Crimea,” comprised of 
Crimea and Sevastopol,11 was declared by so-called local separatists 
but not recognized by any state.  The new “Republic” was short lived, 
as its main political activity consisted of asking Russia to incorporate 
it into the Russian Federation.12  Since the incorporation on March 18, 
2014, Russia considers Crimea and Sevastopol to have been reunified 
with the rodina, the motherland.  The German word “Anschluss” has 
been used to describe the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by 
Russia.13  The term commonly refers to the annexation of Austria into 
Germany on March 12, 1938.  The use of the term anschluss to 
describe recent events in Crimea and Sevastopol, however, can 
disguise that there might be stronger similarity to the annexation of the 
Sudentenland by Germany in late 1938.  The annexation of the 
Sudentenland was based on claims that Germany was protecting ethnic 
Germans in Czechoslovakia.  This was a precursor for the invasion of 
the remainder of Czechoslovakia the following year.  While history is 
not a necessary predictor of future events, the historic parallels are 
troubling.  The annexation of Crimea has been followed by an ongoing 
armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, which seems to follow the same 
pattern of covert operations seen in Crimea, though on a whole new 
level. 
While Eastern and Southern Ukraine are now referred to as “New 
Russia,” Crimea and Sevastopol have a stronger cultural and historical 
bond with Russia.  Crimea had been a part of Russia since 1783, but 
was given by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to 
Ukraine in 1954, when both Russia and Ukraine were part of the Soviet 
Union.  Since the Soviet Union was dominated by Russia, the transfer 
was perceived as symbolic, but also aimed at buying Ukrainian 
 
 11. Autonomous Republic of Crimea: Information Sheet, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
OF UKR., available at http://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-ukraine/info/regions/1-crimea. 
 12. Pro-Russian Leader Asks Putin for Help, CBS NEWS (Mar. 1, 2014), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/crimeas-leader-claims-control-asks-russias-vladimir-
putin-for-help/. 
 13. George Packer, Terms of Crisis, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/03/31/terms-of-crisis; Catherine A. 
Fitzpatrick, Russia This Week: Is the Crimean Annexation Putin’s Anschluss?, THE 
INTERPRETER (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-this-week-hate-
campaigns-against-anti-war-critics/. 
2015  Interim Measures 
39 
compliance with the Soviet regime in the wake of the Holodomor, the 
starvation of millions of Ukrainians in the 1930s.  Among many 
Russians, however, the idea persisted that Crimea and Sevastopol were 
part of Russia.  The port of Sevastopol has long been of enormous 
strategic importance for Russia and was the home base of Russia’s 
Black Sea Fleet even after Ukrainian independence in 1991.  Crimea’s 
strategic location allows control over the Black Sea and consequently 
is vital for securing Russia’s access to the Mediterranean Sea,14 which 
was already an issue in the nineteenth-century. 
Crimea is no stranger to armed conflict: the Crimean War (1854-
1856) pitted Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire against Russia.15  
This conflict concerned blocking Russia’s advances16 towards the 
Danube River17 and the Mediterranean Sea.18  Accordingly, the conflict 
was restricted to the region,19 although there were some British efforts 
to blockade Russian ports in the Baltic Sea.20  The Crimean War was a 
financial disaster for the Ottoman Empire.21  Faced with interest rates 
of up to 30% per year,22 as late the 1870s, the Ottoman Empire had to 
use two-thirds of the state’s income just to service the debt incurred in 
financing the war.23 
In 1944, the Crimean Tatars suffered nearly complete ethnic 
cleansing when 200,000 Crimean Tatars were deported by Stalin.24  
 
 14. Robert Orr, Why Crimea Matters to Russia, FIN. TIMES BLOG (Mar. 3, 2014, 5:22 PM), 
http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2014/03/why-crimea-matters-to-russia/; Caroline 
Mortimer, Ukraine Crisis: Why Is Crimea So Important to Russia?, THE INDEP. (Mar. 
3, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-why-is-
crimea-so-important-to-russia-9166447.html. 
 15. John Darwin, DER IMPERIALE TRAUM - DIE GLOBALGESCHICHTE GROSSER REICHE 
1400-2000, 216 (2010).  
 16. William Woodruff, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 168 (Little Brown 
Book Grp. 2005) (1991).  
 17. Cf. Id. at 74.  
 18. Cf. Id.  
 19. Darwin, supra note 15, at 216. 
 20. Darwin, supra note 15, at 216. 
 21. Darwin, supra note 15, at 275. 
 22. Darwin, supra note 15, at 276. 
 23. Darwin, supra note 15, at 275 et seq. 
 24. Tony Barber, Crimea: A Region Divided, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014, 6:58 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e3d3e3e4-a473-11e3-9cb0-00144feab7de.html#slide0. 
UB Journal of International Law  Vol. III, No. I 
40 
Seventy to ninety thousand were killed or died in the process.25  They 
were resettled after the end of World War II.26  Ten years later, 
Khrushchev transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine,27 ostensibly 
to placate the Ukrainians over the Holodomor.28  Around 80% of the 
population of Crimea are ethnic Russians or speak Russian;29 13% are 
Crimean Tatars.30  During the Soviet era this seemed to be of little 
consequence,31 but when Ukraine became independent in 1991, 
“Crimea [turned], virtually overnight, from a largely Russian-
populated bastion of Soviet naval might into the most ethnically and 
politically contested region of [the] newly independent Ukrainian 
state.”32 
There had been tensions in Crimea prior to Russia’s invasion,33 
but these were by no means so severe as to suggest military action.  
The close cultural and historic ties between Crimea, Sevastopol, and 
Russia also do not justify annexation by Russia.  Throughout European 
history borders have been redrawn many times, and the idea that states’ 
borders should be equal to ethnic home areas harkens back to the 
darkest horrors of war.  After World War II and the Cold War, Europe 
came together in peace and cooperation, with respect for human rights 
and the rule of law.  It seems as if Moscow is sacrificing this consensus 
in favor of regaining the standing it enjoyed on the international stage 
before the end of the Soviet Union. 
Despite Russia’s initial claim that the unidentified soldiers that 
took control of Crimea in the spring of 2014 were Crimean self-defense 
forces,34 rather than forces of the Russian Federation, they were later 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. J. Otto Pohl, The Deportation and Fate of the Crimean Tatars, INT’L COMMITTEE FOR 
CRIMEA (2000), http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/jopohl.html. 
 27. Barber, supra note 24. 
 28. Barber, supra note 24. 
 29. Barber, supra note 24. 
 30. Barber, supra note 24. 
 31. Barber, supra note 24. 
 32. Barber, supra note 24. 
 33. Barber, supra note 24. 
 34. Bill Chappell & Mark Memmott, Putin Says Those Aren’t Russian Forces in Crimea, 
NPR (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2014/03/04/285653335/putin-says-those-arent-russian-forces-in-crimea. 
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confirmed to be Russian.35  As will be shown, Russia is responsible for 
the ongoing human rights violations by these forces in the disputed 
peninsula.  These violations include not only violence and threats 
against Ukrainians, but also attacks against journalists and threats of 
ethnic cleansing.36  The announcement on March 19, 2014 that some 
Crimean Tatars would have to leave their homes in order to 
accommodate the “social needs”37 of ethnic Russians,38 came just one 
day after President Putin had declared that Tatar would become the 
third official language, along with Russian and Ukrainian, in Crimea.39  
If accurate, this report raises serious human rights concerns.  Already 
since the early days of the crisis, the work of journalists in Crimea has 
been subject to severe limitations,40 which include the use of violence 
by pro-Russian forces against reporters addressing the situation there.41 
In the summer of 2014, the situation in Crimea and Sevastopol has 
been stabilized upon incorporation into the Russian Federation, 
although done in violation of international law and of Ukraine’s 
sovereignty.  In the meantime, Russia has built up a large number of 
forces at the border of Ukraine and continues to support armed forces 
that fight a war against the Ukrainian government in the eastern 
provinces of Donetsk and Lugansk, both of which have declared their 
 
 35. Russian Invasion of Ukraine, UKR. POLICY (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://ukrainianpolicy.com/russian-invasion-of-ukraine/. 
 36. Andrew Korybko, Ethnic and Cultural Cleansing in Ukraine, GLOBAL RESEARCH 
(June 18, 2014), http://www.globalresearch.ca/ethnic-and-cultural-cleansing-in-
ukraine/5387539. 
 37. Mary Chastain, Crimean Government Tells Tatars to Leave Their Lands, 
BREITBART.COM (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-
Peace/2014/03/19/Crimean-Government-Tells-Tatars-to-Leave-Their-Lands; Crimean 
Tatars Call on International Community to Support Their Right to Self-Determination, 
UNPO (May 8, 2014), http://www.unpo.org/article/16898. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Alice Speri, Crimean Tatars Hardly Reassured by Putin’s Promise of Inclusion, VICE 
NEWS (Mar. 18, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/crimean-tatars-hardly-reassured-
by-putin-s-promises-of-inclusion. 
 40. Nicholas Williams, Blunt instruments: Media repression in the Ukraine crisis, INDEX 
ON CENSORSHIP (June 25, 2014), http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/06/blunt-
instruments-media-repression-ukraine-crisis/. 
 41. See Antonia Molloy, Ukraine crisis: Ukrainian journalist being held by pro-Russian 
separatists is accused of ‘war crimes’, THE INDEPENDENT, (Apr. 21, 2014), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-ukrainian-journalist-
being-held-by-prorussian-separatists-is-accused-of-war-crimes-9273291.html. 
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independence from Ukraine.42  These battles have led to hundreds of 
thousands of Ukrainians fleeing their homes as well as to an unknown 
number of civilian deaths.43  The conflict gained global attention with 
the shooting down of a civilian airliner, Malaysian Airlines flight 
MH17, which flew over Ukraine during a flight from Amsterdam to 
Kuala Lumpur.44  Russia is suspected of not only training and 
supplying separatist forces fighting in eastern Ukraine but also of 
direct combat activities against Ukraine in Ukrainian territory.  It 
appears that the goal of the current Russian government is not simply 
the annexation of Ukraine, but rather, to turn Ukraine into a failed 
state.45 
This strategy is similar to the 2008 war against Georgia and the 
continuing situation in Moldova, to use the creation of self-proclaimed 
independent ‘states,’ which lack international recognition, to 
destabilize the original country to the point at which further integration 
into either the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) becomes impossible.46  In addition, references 
to parts of Ukraine as “New Russia,” a historic term which dates back 
to Catherine the Great, have raised fears that larger parts of Eastern 
and Southern Ukraine could share Crimea’s fate.47  In late August 
2014, Russian or Russian-supported forces have crossed into Southeast 
 
 42. Stephen Lendman,  Lugansk and Donetsk Declare Independence, STEVE LENDMAN 
BLOG (May 12, 2014), http://sjlendman.blogspot.ch/2014/05/lugansk-and-donetsk-
declare-independence.html. 
 43. Ukraine: UN report shows rising civilian deaths, ongoing rights abuses, UN NEWS 
CENTRE, (Aug. 29, 2014), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48588#.VAiwwMbSSQo. 
 44. Agencies, MH17 crash: Shooting down the Malaysia Airlines Airlines flight ‘may 




 45. Sergey Aleksashenko, Ukraine is Failing as a State, THE MOSCOW TIMES, (Dec. 13, 
2014), http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/ukraine-is-failing-as-a-
state/491462.html. 
 46. Pro-Russian opposition in Moldova spreads anti-EU myths to destabilize situation, 
IPN (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.ipn.md/en/politica/63829. 
 47. Max Fisher, The very scary word in Putin’s new statement on the Ukraine Crisis, VOX 
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.vox.com/2014/8/28/6080589/putin-ukraines-rebels-
novorossiya. 
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Ukraine near Mariupol,48 and a geographical valuation makes it clear 
that it is possible that these forces will attempt to create a land 
connection from Russia proper to occupied Crimea. 
In August 2014, NATO estimated that approximately 1,000 
members of the Russian armed forces were involved in the fighting in 
Ukraine.  The events in Ukraine can be seen as a form of imperialist 
politics that aims at regaining some of the ground lost by Russia since 
the end of the Cold War.  It is important to keep in mind that the 
Russian sphere of influence has shrunk dramatically in the last quarter 
of a century.  In 1989, Russian forces were standing in East Germany.  
Today, many former Warsaw Pact countries are members of NATO 
and the EU.  Therefore, some consider the efforts by the current 
Russian government to be a form of pushback against the West after 
having lost the Cold War.  In some respects, however, Russia has 
joined the rest of Europe.  Russia is a European nation and, like almost 
all European countries (notable exceptions are Belarus, Kosovo,49 
Kazakhstan50), has become a member of the Council of Europe51 
(COE)52 and ratified the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
 48. Alexey Eremenko, As Rebels Advance, Russia Is Accused of Sending Troops to 
Ukraine, THE MOSCOW TIMES, (Aug. 28, 2014), 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/as-rebels-advance-russia-is-accused-of-
sending-troops-to-ukraine/506080.html. 
 49. Kosovo’s Path to the Council of Europe: Identifying Procedures, GROUP FOR LEGAL & 
POL. STUD. (Sept. 2013), http://legalpoliticalstudies.org/2013/09/kosovos-path-to-the-
council-of-europe-identifying-procedures-obstacles-and-solutions-for-membership-2/. 
 50. Hasan Kanbolat, Kazakhstan wants to take its place in Europe, TODAYS ZAMAN 
(Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists/hasan-kanbolat_167154-
kazakhstan-wants-to-take-its-place-in-europe.html. 
 51. MICHAEL HASS, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS- A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 
274-275 (Routledge 2008) (On the Council of Europe). 
 52. The Vatican State is not a member of the Council of Europe either but it has to be kept 
in mind that the Vatican state is a relatively new legal entity and that the Catholic 
Church has traditionally been represented on the international stage by the Holy See. 
While the Vatican State is a party to technical treaties concerning e.g. 
Telecommunication or Postal Services, foreign affairs and human rights issues are 
dealt with by the Holy See. While it is prevented from being a party to many 
international treaties which are only open to states, the Holy See enjoys observer status 
at many international organizations, including the Council of Europe. By seeking 
observer status, the Holy See can express its support for the efforts of an organization, 
even if is is unable to join. This, too, can be said for the Council of Europe’s work, in 
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(ECHR).53  The European system of human rights protection54 has long 
served to protect human rights by giving victims a place in 
international law, but also allows states to invoke human rights vis-à-
vis other states who have ratified the Convention.55 
 
II. THE CASE OF UKRAINE V. RUSSIA BEFORE 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. Application 
 
On March 13, 2014, Ukraine brought a case against Russia before 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).56  The legal basis for 
this inter-state case is Article 33 ECHR, to which both Ukraine and 
Russia are parties.57  The relevant provision reads as follows: 
Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged 
breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto 
by another High Contracting Party.58 
The ECtHR, which is based in Strasbourg, France, is still dealing 
with the case, and at the time of writing no decision has been made on 
the material questions of the case.  However, on the day of the 
application, the Court issued interim measures.59 
 
particular in the fields of peaceful coexistence and cooperation in Europe as well as the 
protection of human rights.   
 53. Press Country Profile: Russia, EUR. CT. H.R., 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Russia_ENG.pdf (last updated Oct. 2014). 
 54. For an overview over the European human rights system, see Rhona K.M. Smith, 
TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 96 et seq. (2014). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Ukraine v. Russia, App. No. 20158/14, EUR. CT. H.R., HUDOC (Mar. 13, 2014), 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
 57. Council of Europe, EUR. CONV. FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 
33. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Press Release, Registrar of the Court, EUR. CT. H.R., Interim Measures Granted in 
Inter-State Case Brought by Ukraine Against Russia (Mar. 13, 2014), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/003-4699472-5703982. 
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B. Rights concerned 
The application only relates to the situation in Crimea.  Because 
the application by Ukraine remains secret for the duration of the 
proceedings, the exact details of Ukraine’s claims are unknown.  There 
are still some open questions surrounding the case.  At this time “it 
cannot be determined on which specific criteria the court based its 
imposition of interim measures.  [I]nterim measures are not published 
with official court reasons [and] the Ukrainian Government’s 
application entered under Article 33 of the ECHR is not yet accessible, 
rendering it hard to give a prognosis regarding its chance of success.”60  
Also, “the question [has been raised] whether this might be a case of 
“legal forum shopping” and if the [International Court of Justice] 
might not have been”61 a more appropriate forum for what is essentially 
an international conflict, which now has taken on a military dimension. 
It appears likely that the case will show parallels to that of Georgia 
v. Russia (II).62  This case is not to be confused with Georgia v. Russia 
(I),63 which was brought before the ECtHR in 2007 and decided in the 
summer of 2014, and which dealt with the expulsion of Georgian 
citizens from Russia.64  Georgia v. Russia (II), on the other hand, deals 
with events in the context of Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia65 
which led to the creation of two self-proclaimed but hardly recognized 
would-be ‘states,’ South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  This is a reminder that 
Russia’s tactics of astro-turf-separatism is hardly new. 
 
 60. Frederike Kollmer, In the interim in Strasbourg re: the crisis in Crimea, in: 
CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (2014), 
http://cjicl.org.uk/2014/03/27/interim-strasbourg-re-crisis-crimea/. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See Philip Leach, Ukraine, Russia and Crimea in the European Court of Human 
Rights, EJIL TALK! (Mar.  19, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/ukraine-russia-and-
crimea-in-the-european-court-of-human-rights/. 
 63. Georgia v. Russia (I), App. No. 13255/07, EUR. CT. H.R. (June 30, 2009), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145546. 
 64. Press Release, EUR. CT. H.R., Russia’s Policy in 2006 of Arresting, Detaining, and 
Expelling Large Numbers of Georgian Nationals Violated the Convention (July 3, 
2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4811514-
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 65. Georgia v. Russia (II), App. No. 38263/08, EUR. CT. H.R. (Dec. 13, 2011), 
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The inter-state case of Georgia v. Russia (II), which was held to 
be admissible in 2011 and is still pending before the Court,66 has visible 
parallels to the ongoing conflict.  Georgia claimed “that, in the course 
of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks by Russian forces and/
or by the separatist forces under their control, hundreds of civilians 
were injured, killed, detained or went missing, thousands of civilians 
had their property and homes destroyed and over 300,000 people were 
forced to”67 flee.  At the time of writing, the number of refugees in the 
Ukraine crisis, according to estimates by Russian authorities and the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), is more than one 
million, most of whom have fled to Russia.68  In Georgia v. Russia (II), 
Russia claimed that it did not have jurisdiction over the combat area69 
and doubted the applicability of the ECHR to armed conflict.70 
In addition to the examples of violations of Georgia’s territorial 
integrity as well as the ‘republics’ in Crimea (including Sevastopol), 
Donetsk and Luhansk, the case of Transnistria comes to mind.  The 
latter is a strip of land east of the Dniester river in Moldova, which 
declared its independence shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union.  To 
this day, Russian “peacekeepers” operate in Transnistria, and it is 
claimed that many among the local population (as in South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia, Donetsk and Luhansk) within the disputed territory wish to 
become part of the Russian Federation.  Should Russian forces conquer 
the south of Ukraine, this territory would border Transnistria, 
suggesting a wider Russian claim. 
The referendum, which from a Russian perspective paved the way 
for the breaking away of Crimea and Sevastopol from Ukraine, has 
already been viewed as illegal.71  Despite the illegality of conquest by 
force,72 the Russian Federation has been in de facto control of Crimea 
and Sevastopol since March.  While an occupied state remains 
responsible under the ECHR for human rights violations across its 
 
 66. Id., ¶ 20.  
 67. Georgia v. Russia, supra note 65. 
 68. Number of displaced inside Ukraine more than doubles since early August to 260,000, 
UNHCR (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/540590ae9.html. 
 69. Leach, supra note 62. 
 70. Leach, supra note 62. 
 71. Brilmayer, supra note 1. 
 72. Brilmayer, supra note 1. 
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territory,73 it will be shown that Russia has jurisdiction over Crimea 
and Sevastopol within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR.74  Jurisdiction 
in this sense of the term, however, does not give Russia any legal title 
to this territory but can only trigger Russia’s responsibility under the 
ECHR.75 
C. Decision of 13 March 2014 
 
On the same day that Ukraine brought the case to the European 
Court of Human Rights, the ECtHR granted the applicant interim relief 
and ordered both State parties “to refrain from taking any measures, in 
particular military actions, which might entail breaches of the 
Convention rights of the civilian population, including putting their life 
and health at risk, and to comply with their engagements under the 
Convention, notably in respect of Articles 2 (right to life) and 3 
(prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment).”76 
The case raises three issues which need to be dealt with in more 
detail: 1) how do inter-state cases before the ECtHR work and which 
effect can they have;77 2) how is interim relief granted and 
implemented in proceedings before the ECtHR, and can notions on 
interim relief in Article 43 cases be transferred to interim relief issues 
in Article 33 cases;78 and 3) which state is actually responsible for 
human rights violations in Crimea and Sevastopol?79 
 
 
 73. Noam Lubell, Human Rights Obligations in Military Occupation, 94 INT’L REV. OF 
THE RED CROSS 317, 333-34(2012), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2012/irrc-885-lubell.pdf. 
 74. Council of Europe, EUR. CONV. FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 
1. 
 75. See generally id. 
 76. Id. at art. 2. 
 77. Ukraine v. Russia, App. No. 20958/14, 073, EUR. CT. H.R. (2014). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
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III. INTER-STATE CASES BEFORE THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The individual complaint procedure under Article 34 is the feature 
of the ECHR which provides a real “[n]ovelty”80 in that it had not been 
possible before for individuals to sue states on an international level.81  
Today, individuals are significantly more important for international 
law than they used to be in classical, Westphalian, international law.82  
The procedure under Article 34 remains the crowning achievement of 
this development.83  The inter-state procedure under Article 3384 on the 
other hand, is a reminder that the ECHR, despite its nature as a self-
contained legal regime, which has taken international law to an entirely 
new level, remains an international treaty between states. 
Just as the states are the primary focus for the application of the 
Convention and therefore have the primary responsibility for 
compliance, the procedure under Article 33 ECHR is a reminder of the 
states’ responsibilities.85  By virtue of Article 33, not only the European 
Court of Human Rights, but all states which are parties to the 
Convention have a “guardian function”86 with regard to the ECHR.  
However, states are usually reluctant to sacrifice good political 
relations for the purposes of human rights.  Therefore, the inter-state 
procedure under Art. 33 “has generally been used very sparingly.”87  
States which have ratified the ECHR have resorted to this instrument 
only in rare and very serious cases.  Examples of such cases include 
 
 80. Stefan Kirchner, The Pre-Natal Personal Scope of Article 2 Section1 Sentence 1 of the 
Eur. Convention on Human Rights, 6 LAW AND FORENSIC SCI. 94, 94 (2012). 
 81. Alastair Mowbray, The European Convention, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW- SIX DECADES AFTER THE UDHR AND BEYOND  271, 288 (Mashood A. Baderin & 
Manisuli Ssenyojo, eds., 2010). 
 82. Christopher C. Joyner, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY – RULES FOR 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 62 (2005). 
 83. ECHR, supra note 74 at art. 34 
 84. See HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOLDMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 947-63 (3rd ed. 2008) (providing an overview on all the case law 
on Article 33 ECHR cases). 
 85. Council of Europe, supra note 74 at art. 34 
 86. CHRISTOPH GRABENWARTER, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS – 
COMMENTARY 8 (2014). 
 87. Ukraine v. Russia, App. No. 20958/14, 073, EUR. CT. H.R. (2014). 
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the so called Greek Case88 during military rule, and mainly (but not 
necessarily),89 those cases which involve violations of the human rights 
of their own nationals by another state,90 such as in the case of 
Denmark v. Turkey91 and Georgia v. Russia (I).92 
The European Court of Human Rights is also no stranger to armed 
conflicts, having ruled on the use of force with regard to military 
operations in the former Yugoslavia,93 Chechnya,94 Turkey95 and Iraq.96  
International Humanitarian Law and the ECHR are not mutually 
exclusive,97 and the ECHR is also applicable in wartime, as evidenced 
by the existence of rules in the Convention, which provide for the 
possibility of derogations in wartime and similar situations.98  Indeed, 
the European Court of Human Rights has already dealt with the 
aftermath of armed conflicts, such as the invasion and continuing 
occupation of a part of Cyprus by Turkey,99 or Russia’s 2008 war 
against Georgia.100  The case brought before the Court by Ukraine only 
refers to the situation in Crimea. 
 
 
 88. Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands v. Greece, App. No. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67, 
3344/67 Eur. Comm’n on H.R. (“The Greek Case,” 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
XII).  
 89. Cf. GRABENWARTER, supra note 86 at 48. 
 90. Cf. GRABENWARTER, supra note 86 at 48. 
 91. Cf. GRABENWARTER, supra note 86 at 48. 
 92. Leach, supra note 62. 
 93. Bankovic et. al. v. Belgium et. al., App. No. 52207/99, EUR. CT. H.R. (2001). 
 94. Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, EUR. CT. H.R. (2005). 
 95. Mentes et. al v. Turkey, App. No. 58/1996/667/867, EUR. CT. H.R. (1997). 
 96. Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29750/09, Information Note on the Court’s case-
law No. 164, 164 EUR. CT. H.R. (1997), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=002-7571. 
 97. UN Human Rights Committee, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 31, ¶ 11. U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add/13 (May 26, 2004), http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/419/56/PDF/G0441956.pdf?OpenElement.  
 98. Stefan Kirchner, Human Rights Guarantees during States of Emergency: The 
European Convention on Human Rights, 3 BALTIC J. OF LAW AND POL. 2, 1 et seq. 
(2010). 
 99. Frank Hoffmeister, Case note: Cyprus v. Turkey, 96 A.J.I.L. 445 et seq. (2002). 
 100. Leach, supra note 62. 
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IV. INTERIM RELIEF UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS101 
 
Normally the European Court of Human Rights takes years to 
conclude a case.  This comes as no surprise because the forty-seven 
judges are inundated with cases, and despite efforts to make it more 
difficult to bring a case before the court with tightened admissibility 
requirements, the Court still has a large backlog.  Sometimes, though, 
a case brought before the Court requires an immediate response.  The 
European Convention on Human Rights does not provide for such a 
possibility.102  The Court has created procedural rules, the Rules of 
Court (RoC).103  Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows the Court to act 
quickly,104  and to “indicate that a measure be taken in the interests of 
the parties or the proper conduct of proceedings.”105  Usually, this 
means protecting the applicant against impending state measures, 
which could impact his or her rights to an extent that the exercise of 
the human rights in question becomes difficult or impossible, or could 
cause damage to the applicant during the course of the proceedings. 
Typically, the applicant will be in a much weaker position than 
the state, and while the Court will remain neutral towards the parties, 
the structure of ECHR cases will often require the Court to stop the 
state from behaving in a certain way, although interim measures can 
be imposed on the applicant as well.106  In the following, we will first 
look at interim measures in cases of individual applications under 
Article 34, of which there are far more than in Article 33 cases, before 
 
 101. See generally R. St. J. MacDonald, Interim Measures in International Law with 
Special Reference to the European System for the Protection of Human Rights, 52 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 
[HEIDELBERG J. OF INT’L LAW] 703 (1992) (Ger.). 
 102. See generally, Council of Europe, supra note 74. 
 103. EUR. CT. H.R., RULES OF COURT (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf. 
 104. Id. at Rule 39. 
 105. KAREN REID, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 9 (2007); EUR. CT. H.R., supra note 103 at Rule 39. 
 106. KAREN REID, supra note 105 at 21. 
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dealing with the question of the transferability of notions developed by 
the Court in individual complaints to inter-state cases.107 
In Article 34 cases, the respondent state is considered to have 
violated the right to individual petition, which is inherent in Article 34, 
if it fails to comply with interim measures.108  While interim measures 
are not included in the Convention, Rule 39 RoC is used to interpret 
Article 34.  Because the Convention is based on the idea of effective 
protection of human rights,109 the possibility to bring a case before the 
Court under Article 34 is not just the result of a procedural rule, but 
actually a right under the Convention, and compliance with Article 34 
requires states to take measures aimed at safeguarding the human 
rights in relation to which a complaint has been lodged under Article 
34.  This necessarily includes compliance with interim measures 
ordered by the court. 
In order to enforce judgments, the European human rights system 
relies on the Council of Europe’s Council of Ministers.110  As far as 
compliance with interim measures is concerned “the Court [. . .] relies 
on the good will and co-operation of the Contracting States.”111  
Therefore the Court will only take interim measures if there is a 
“pressing reason”112 to take urgent action in order to safeguard human 
rights; “it is only in cases of extreme urgency that interim measures are 
indicated: the fact must prima facie point [to] a violation of the 
Convention, and the omission to take the proposed measures must 
result or threaten to result in irreparable injury to certain vital interests 
of the parties or to the progress of the examination.”113  To highlight 
 
 107. Council of Europe, supra note 74 at art. 34. 
 108. Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, App. No. 46827/99, 46951/99, EUR. CT. H.R. 
(2005); Council of Europe, supra note 74 at art. 34; REID, supra note 105 at 19. 
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(2005). 
 110. Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and Decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Presentation/Pres_Exec_en.asp. 
 111. Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, App. No. 46827/99, 46951/99, EUR. CT. H.R., 
(2005); REID, supra note 105, at 19. 
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how restrictively the Court has used Rule 39 RoC, it is noteworthy that 
not even detention issues are thought to normally require such 
measures.114 
If interim measures are ordered, the respondent government is 
informed at once and the case is fast-tracked “for review at an early 
opportunity. If the request is refused, the case may nonetheless proceed 
for examination on admissibility and merits in the normal manner.”115  
The review is necessary because the application of Rule 39 RoC 
requires a risk to human rights.116  If that risk no longer exists, the 
interim measures will not be continued, as the reason for the 
application no longer exists.117  “The Court’s competence to issue 
interim measures is not granted by the ECHR itself, but governed by 
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which the High Contracting Parties do 
not submit themselves to, but which are adopted by the Court itself in 
accordance with Article 25 literal “d” of the ECHR.”118 
The Rules of Court were not agreed upon by the states’ parties to 
the ECHR directly, but were created by the ECtHR on the behalf of the 
ECHR and therefore are considered to be “derived consensual law. . . 
[T]he ECHR initially negated a binding effect of interim measures 
even after Protocol no. 11 came into effect.”119  In Cruz Varas v. 
Sweden120 the ECtHR “had to decide on the argument that the failure 
to comply with the Commission’s indication of an interim measure 
amounted to a violation of Sweden’s obligation under Article 25 (the 
present Article 34) not to hinder the effective exercise of the right of 
individual petition.”121  It held that this was not the case,122 but that the 
Court had to rely on the “good faith co-operation”123 of states.  This 
view, however, was not to last. 
 
 114. REID, supra note 105, at 20. 
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In Mamatkulov and Adburasulovic v. Turkey124 as well as in the 
first Öcalan case, Öcalan v. Turkey,125 the Court decided that interim 
measures under Rule 39 RoC are indeed legally binding.126  Non-
compliance with an interim measure “can lead to a violation of the 
right of individual application (under Article 34 ECHR), at least if the 
contested act . . . has effected the core of the right of individual 
application.’’127  Since Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey the ECtHR 
considers them to be binding.128  The ECtHR has “[f]ollow[ed] the 
“trend” set by the ICJ in the LaGrand case,”129 but then went far beyond 
it by expanding the definition of what is required by states in order to 
avoid running afoul of the Convention.  In the case of Olaechea 
Cahuas v. Spain, the court ruled that: 
[N]on-compliance with the interim measures per se would result 
in a breach of the Convention. It assumed this to be the case, regardless 
of the fact that non-compliance with an interim measure did not lead, 
post facto, to an infringement of the right to application in accordance 
with Article 34 of the ECHR. The Court confirmed this assumption in 
the case of Mostafa et al. v. Turkey. Thereby it elevates – and this is 
quite remarkable – a simple regulatory rule to the status of a 
Convention right, by linking Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, directly to 
Article 34 of the ECHR. The court’s argument here again is one of 
efficiency.130 
At the end of the day, states are more likely than not to comply 
with interim measures imposed by the ECtHR.131  The rules on interim 
measures apply equally if the application is lodged under Article 34 or 
under Article 33 of the ECHR.132 
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V. JURISDICTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
FOR EVENTS ON CRIMEA 
 
The Court’s decision on interim relief does not answer the 
question of whether Russia will be held accountable for human rights 
violations happening in Ukraine.  As a general rule, a state is 
responsible for human rights violations in its territory.  The annexation 
of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation was illegal under 
international law.  Yet, neither from Russia’s claim to these territories 
nor from the illegality of the annexation can we draw any final 
conclusions with regard to Russia’s responsibility concerning the 
Crimean peninsula.  The decisive question is if Russia has jurisdiction 
within the meaning of Art. 1 ECHR, which requires that the state in 
question “actually exercises effective overall control over a certain 
area.”133  It does not matter how this control is organized; “[t]his 
control may either be exercised directly, through armed forces, [which 
might very well be the case by now] or through a subordinate local 
administration.”134 
In cases in which the area in question is part of the territory of a 
state that has also ratified ECHR, the Court is more willing to hold the 
interfering state accountable.135  The Court has held states that have 
ratified the ECHR to be responsible under the Convention for human 
rights violations abroad.  It has done so both in cases in which the 
human rights violation happened in another COE member state, and in 
cases in which it did not.  “Where the territory of one Convention state 
is occupied by the armed forces of another, the occupying state should 
in principle be held accountable under the Convention for breaches of 
human rights within the occupied territory, because to hold otherwise 
would be to deprive the population of that territory of the rights and 
freedoms they would have enjoyed.”136 
 
 133. GRABENWARTER, supra note 86, at 8. 
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This kind of jurisdiction beyond a state’s borders is not the only 
way for Ukraine to bring Russia to court.  While the ECHR is usually 
perceived through the lens of the individual complaint procedure under 
Art. 34 ECHR, and constitutes a self-contained regime, the ECHR 
remains an international treaty.  A violation of the ECHR by any state 
is not only a violation of human rights but a violation of international 
law obligations to all other parties to the ECHR.  While inter-state 
cases are rare when compared to individual applications, inter-state 
complaints are the regular way in which the ECHR is given force as an 
international treaty (while individual applications fulfill this function 
for the ECHR as a human rights treaty.)  Inter-state cases not only serve 
the interests of states but the protection of European Human rights law.  
By bringing the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human 
Rights, Ukraine not only defended its own interests and the rights of 
its citizens and residents, but also the ECHR. 
Article 1 ECHR refers to the factual exercise of jurisdiction.137  
Under general international law, Crimea and Sevastopol are still part 
of Ukraine.  Ukraine therefore has legal title to the disputed territory 
but cannot exercise jurisdiction due to the occupation by Russia.  This 
does not mean that Ukraine does not have any responsibility with 
regard to what happens in its territory.  One way in which Ukraine can 
live up to its responsibilities under the ECHR is to demand the de facto 
power, Russia, to respect human rights.  Ukraine has done so by 
bringing the case before the European Court of Human Rights under 
Article 33.138  It would be well advised to expand the case to include 
the ongoing situation in the East and South-East of the country as well. 
Russia occupies the territory and exercises jurisdiction there even 
without having title to the territory.  From the moment Russia 
effectively controlled Crimea and Sevastopol, the Russian Federation 
had jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 ECHR.139  Given that 
Russian covert operatives and later overt Russian armed forces played 
a role in the breakaway of Crimea and Sevastopol, Russia exercised 
jurisdiction at least over parts of the peninsula before incorporating 
Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation.  Even if the self-
 
 137. Council of Europe, supra note 74, at art 1. 
 138. Council of Europe, supra note 74, at art 33. 
 139. Council of Europe, supra note 74, at art 1. 
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declared Republic of Crimea were a state (which it is not due to the 
collective non-recognition by the international community),140 though 
it is not a party to the ECHR, the Convention would still have a residual 
effect.141 
In the conflict with Ukraine, Russia has claimed a need to deploy 
forces across the border in order to protect Russian-speaking persons 
who live in Ukraine,142 essentially considering them to be ethnic 
Russians.  While the protection of nationals abroad has long been a 
sensitive topic in international relations,143 Russia’s claim seems to 
extend to persons of Russian ethnicity who are not necessarily citizens 
of the Russian Federation.  This claim is not only troubling for states 
with large Russian speaking populations, such as Latvia,144 
Kazakhstan,145 or Estonia,146 but is also a departure from international 
law in this regard.  It cannot be ruled out, however, that Russia gives 
citizenship of the Russian Federation to ethnic Russians who live 
abroad, thereby instantaneously creating a link between the Russian 
state and foreign residents.147  While Crimea’s declaration of 
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independence, and consequently Russia’s annexation of Crimea, is 
incompatible with international law, the Russian government also 
claimed that there was a need to intervene in Crimea in order to protect 
the ethnic Russians who are living there.148  This makes it necessary to 
understand how international law in general addresses the protection 
of a state’s own nationals who live abroad. 
In general, states have a right to protect their nationals abroad.  
Usually this happens through normal diplomatic and consular 
channels.  In extreme cases, states may use a limited amount of force 
to protect nationals abroad, for example by deploying military assets 
to evacuate nationals from crisis areas.  This right is of course restricted 
to nationals and, in exceptional cases, nationals of other states, if said 
third states have consented to such an action.149  While the target 
country will usually be asked for its consent, this will not always be 
possible, and in urgent cases the rescuing state will be able to invoke 
the doctrine of necessity for this purpose.150  These rescue operations 
in extreme circumstances are considered legal under customary 
international law, in particular because they do not amount to an illegal 
armed attack against the country concerned. 
In the case of Crimea, there was no concrete danger to Russians 
in Crimea, only an abstract possibility that the new leadership in Kyiv 
might not be as positively positioned towards ethnic Russians as the 
last government.  Specific human rights violations by the new 
government against ethnic Russians have not been made public.  
Therefore, there was no need for Russian military intervention, let 
alone one of such wide scope as to take over Crimea – not to mention 
the later annexation of the peninsula.  Russia may claim that the 
persons in question were ethnic Russians, and indeed, Russia had 
already been handing out passports to inhabitants of the Crimea 
peninsula prior to the annexation.151  This mirrors Russia’s behavior in 
the Georgian breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
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2008.152  While doing so might not be illegal per se, Russia would have 
to comply with the test laid down in Nottebohm,153 which requires a 
genuine link between the state and the individual.154 
Ethnicity could be sufficient to establish such a link.  Even if we 
assume that ethnic Russians or a number of Russian citizens had been 
at risk, this would not have justified the outright annexation of Crimea.  
At most, Russia would have been allowed to take measures to protect 
her citizens.  As not even the Quebéc155 requirements for independence 
were met, the annexation was incompatible with international law as 
well.  By annexing Crimea and Sevastopol, Russia has also violated 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity.  The intervention by the Russian 
Federation is incompatible with international law and cannot be 
justified by recourse to the notion of the protection of citizens who 
reside abroad.  From the perspective of Article 1, however, it appears 
clear that Russia exercises jurisdiction in Crimea and Sevastopol and 




At the time of writing in late August 2014, the case between 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation is still pending before the 
European Court of Human Rights and the situation continues to 
develop, in particular in the Eastern and Southeastern parts of Ukraine 
where fighting has become significantly more intense during the final 
week of August.157  The documents submitted by the parties will only 
be made public after the conclusion of the case by the Court.  Until 
then, press releases by the European Court of Human Rights will form 
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the most reliable official source of information on this case.  However, 
it is possible to put this case into perspective against the background 
of both the European Convention on Human Rights and earlier inter-
state cases brought against Russia before the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
In December 2014, Ukraine decided to end its non-aligned status 
and it is now pursuing NATO membership158 but while membership in 
the Western alliance remains unlikely in light of the ongoing dispute 
with Russia, Ukraine might be well advised to follow the Finnish 
example and serve as a neutral state and a gateway between Western 
Europe and Russia, 159  albeit with close ties to the West (Finland is a 
member of the EU and cooperates with NATO on some security 
issues.)160  As the flame of freedom has been carried eastward in the 
20th century, it has to be the long-term goal of Europe to fully integrate 
Russia into the European family of nations.  An important step in this 
direction has been Russia’s ratification of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.161  Recent measures taken by Russian authorities to 
quell dissent and to limit peace demonstrations, as well as reports of 
human rights violations against religious minorities and journalists in 
Crimea, however, indicate that this, too, remains a significant 
challenge. 
This challenge is increased by the apparently growing focus of 
Russian authorities on self-reliance and isolation.  A Russian 
Federation which is isolated will not only be harder to integrate into 
the European legal system, but is also more likely to allow violations 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.  Such violations, 
systematic human rights violations in particular (as seen in Crimea), 
will need an effective response from other European nations, as well 
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as from Europe’s human rights institutions.  The interim measure 
issued by the European Court of Human Rights on March 13, 2014162 
is an important step in the right direction.  It remains to be seen if 
Russia will comply with this ruling. While the Court has made it clear 
that interim measures are binding,163 “there has been a perceptible 
increase in the rate of states’ non-compliance with rule 39 in recent 
years.”164 
In 1988, the year Mikhail Gorkachev argued for human rights to 
play a role in the legal system of the USSR,165 the first law school in 
the Soviet Union opened a department dedicated to human rights.166  
Today’s Russia might have abandoned communism but it can be seen 
in a tradition of Russian attempts to gain geopolitical features, or in 
other words, an empire.  During the occupation of East Germany after 
World War II, the Soviet Union installed ‘‘judges’’ who were loyal 
adherents of Soviet ideology but lacked all legal training.167  It has to 
be feared that Russian’s puppet ‘states’ will act similarly in the parts 
of Ukraine now under Russian control. 
The declaration of independence of the self-proclaimed Republic 
of Crimea was incompatible with international law,168 as is Russia’s 
continued intervention in Ukraine.  Both the European Union169 and 
the Council of Europe170 are committed “to secure peace and prosperity 
in Europe and to achieve an ever closer union among its peoples.”171  
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The current Russian government seems to have abandoned this ideal, 
raising the question whether Russia would comply with an eventual 
judgment by the European Court of Human Rights.  This would 
seriously undermine the position of the Court, which, so far, has 
enjoyed a very high rate of compliance with its judgments.172  The 
ongoing occupation of the Crimean peninsula shows disrespect for the 
Court, and the continued fighting in other parts of Ukraine shows a 
lack of respect for the spirit of the Convention.  While the Convention 
also applies in times of war,173 the use of force, especially against 
civilians, contradicts the goals of the Convention. 
After the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union/ the Russian 
Federation became a much weaker state.174  It appears that the current 
Russian government seems to seek power through both direct and 
indirect armed force.  When Russia joined the Council of Europe in 
1996, and subsequently a party to the ECHR,175 Russia’s legal system 
did not meet the standards required by the Council of Europe.176  The 
ECHR serves not only the protection of human rights but also of 
democratic principles.177  By suing Russia in Strasbourg, Ukraine can 
also make a case for the continued preservation of democratic ideals in 
Eastern Ukraine.  Outside efforts to ensure respect for human rights in 
Crimea and the other parts of Ukraine, which are affected by the 
current conflict, should not be seen by either side as a form of 
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